A privacy-preserving Support Vector Machine (SVM) computing scheme is proposed in this paper. Cloud computing has been spreading in many fields. However, the cloud computing has some serious issues for end users, such as unauthorized use and leak of data, and privacy compromise. We focus on templates protected by using a random unitary transformation, and consider some properties of the protected templates for secure SVM computing, where templates mean features extracted from data. The proposed scheme enables us not only to protect templates, but also to have the same performance as that of unprotected templates under some useful kernel functions. Moreover, it can be directly carried out by using well-known SVM algorithms, without preparing any algorithms specialized for secure SVM computing. In the experiments, the proposed scheme is applied to a face-based authentication algorithm with SVM classifiers to confirm the effectiveness.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing and edge computing have been spreading in many fields, with the development of cloud services. However, the computing environment has some serious issues for end users, such as unauthorized use and leak of data, and privacy compromise, due to unreliability of providers and some accidents. While, a lot of studies on secure, efficient and flexible communications, storage and computation have been reported [1] - [3] . For securing data, full encryption with provable security (like RSA, AES, etc) is the most secure option. However, many multimedia applications have been seeking a trade-off in security to enable other requirements, e.g., low processing demands, retaining bitstream compliance, and flexible processing in the encrypted domain, so that a lot of perceptual encryption schemes have been studied as one of the schemes for achieving a trade-off [4] - [13] In the recent years, considerable efforts have been made in the fields of fully homomorphic encryption and multi-party computation [14] - [17] . However, these schemes can not be applied yet to SVM algorithms, although it is possible to carry out some statistical analysis of categorical and ordinal data. Moreover, the schemes have to prepare algorithms specialized for computing encrypted data.
Because of such a situation, we propose a privacypreserving SVM computing scheme in this paper . We focus on templates protected by using a random unitary transformation, which have been studied as one of methods for cancelable biometrics [18] - [24] , and then consider some properties of the protected templates for secure SVM computing, where templates mean features extracted from data. As a result, the proposed scheme enables us not only to protect templates, but also to have the same performance as that of unprotected templates under some useful kernel functions as isotropic stationary kernels. Moreover, it can be directly carried out by using well-known SVM algorithms, without preparing any algorithms specialized for secure SVM computing. In the experiments, the proposed scheme is applied to a face recognition algorithm with SVM classifiers to confirm the effectiveness.
II. PREPARATION

A. Support Vector Machine
Support Vector Machine (SVM) is a supervised machine learning algorithm which can be used for both classification or regression challenges, but it is mostly used in classification problems. In SVM, we input a feature vector x to the discriminant function as
where ω is a weight parameter, and b is a bias. SVM also has a technique called the kernel trick, which is a function that takes low dimensional input space and transform it to a higher dimensional space. These functions are called kernels. The kernel trick could be applied to Eq. (1) to map an input vector on further high dimension feature space, and then to linearly classify it on that space as
The function ϕ(x) : R d → F maps an input vector x on high dimension feature space F, where d is the number of the dimensions of features. In this case, feature space F includes parameter ω (ω ∈ F ). The kernel function of two vectors x i , x j is defined as
where ⟨·, ·⟩ is an inner product. There are various kernel functions. For example, Radial Basis Function(RBF) kernel is given by
and polynomial kernel is provided by
where Υ is a high parameter to decide the complexity of boundary determination, l is a parameter to decide the degree of the polynomial, and T indicates transpose. This paper aims to propose a new framework to carry out SVM with protected vectors. Figure 1 illustrates the scenario used in this paper. In the enrollment, client i, i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N }, prepares training samples g i,j , j ∈ {1, 2, ..., M } such as images, and a feature set f i,j , called a template, is extracted from the samples. Next the client creates a protected template setf i,j by a secret key p i and sends the set to a cloud server. The server stores it and implements learning with the protected templates for a classification problem.
B. Scenario
In the authentication, Client i creates a protected template as a query and sends it to the server. The server carries out a classification problem with a learning model prepared in advance, and then returns the result to Client i.
Note that the cloud server has no secret keys and the classification problem can be directly carried out by using well-known SVM algorithms. In the other words, the server does not have to prepare any algorithms specialized for the classification in the encrypted domain.
III. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
In this section, protected templates generated by using a random unitary matrix are conducted, and a SVM computation scheme with the protected templates is proposed under some kernel functions.
A. Template Protection
Template protection schemes based on unitary transformations have been studied as one of methods for cancelable biometrics [18] - [23] . This paper has been inspired by those studies.
A template f i,j ∈ R d is protected by a unitary matrix having randomness with a key p i , Q pi ∈ C N ×N as,
wheref i,j is the protected template. Various generation schemes of Q pi have been studied to generate unitary or orthogonal random matrices such as Gram-Schmidt method, random permutation matrices and random phase matrices [22] , [23] . For example, the Gram-Schmidt method can be applied to a pseudo-random matrix to generate Q pi . Security analysis of the protection schemes have been also considered in terms of brute-force attacks, diversity and irreversibility.
B. SVM with protected templates 1) Properties
Protected templates generated according to Eq. (6) have the following properties under p i = p s [23] .
Property 1 : Conservation of the Euclidean distances:
Property 2 : Conservation of inner products:
Property 3 : Conservation of correlation coefficients:
where f s,t is a template of another client s, s ∈ {1, 2, ..., N }, who has M training samples g s,t , t ∈ {1, 2, ..., M }.
2) Classes of kernels
We consider applying the protected templates to a kernel function. In the case of using RBF kernel, the following relation is satisfied from property 1 and Eq.(4)
A stationary kernel K S (x i − x j ) is one which is translation invariant:
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For examples, RBF, WAVE and Rational quadratic kernels belong to this class, i.e, isotropic stationary kernel, called kernel class 1 in this paper. If kernels are isotropic, the propose scheme is useful under the kernels. Besides, from property 3, we can also use a kernel K In (⟨x i , x j ⟩) that depends only on the inner products between two vectors given as
Polynomial kernel and linear kernel are in this class, referred to as class 2. Some kernels such as Fisher and p-spectrum ones, to which the protected templates can not be applied, belong to other classes. We focus on using kernel class 1 and class 2.
3) Dual problem
Next, we consider binary classification that is the task of classifying the elements of a given set. A dual problem to implement a SVM classifier with protected templates is expressed as
where y i,j and y s,t ∈ {+1, −1} are correct labels for each training data, α i,j and α s,t are dual variables and C is a regular coefficient. If we use kernel class 1 or class 2 described above, the inner product ⟨ϕ(f i,j ), ϕ(f s,t )⟩ is equal to K(f i,j , f s,t ). Therefore, even in the case of using protected templates, the dual problem with protected templates is reduced to the same problem as that of the original templates. This conclusion means that the use of the proposed templates gives no effect to the performance of the SVM classifier under kernel class 1 and class 2.
C. Relation among keys
As shown in Fig 1, a protected templatef i,j is generated from training data g i,j by using a key p i . Two relations among keys are summarized, here.
1) Key condition 1:
The first key choice is to use a common key in all clients, namely, p 1 = p 2 = ... = p N . In this case, all protected templates satisfy the properties described in III-B, so the SVM classifier has the same performance as that of using the original templates. 
The second key choice is to use a different key in each client, namely p 1 ̸ = p 2 ̸ = ... ̸ = p N . In this case, the three properties are satisfied only among templates with a common key. This key condition allows us to enhance the robustness of the security against various attacks as discussed later.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The propose scheme was applied to face recognition experiments which were carried out as a dual problem.
A. Data Set
We used Extended Yale Face Database B [24] that consists of 2432 frontal facial images with 192×168-pixels of N = 38 persons like Fig 2. 64 images for each person were divided into half randomly for training data samples and queries. We used random permutation matrices as unitary matrices to produce protected templates. Besides, RBF kernel and linear kernel were used, where they belong to kernel class 1 and class 2, respectively. The protection was applied to templates with 1216 dimensions generated by the down-sampling method [21] . The down-sampling method divides an image into nonoverlapped blocks and then calculates the mean value in each block. Figure 3 shows the examples of an original template and the protected one.
B. Results and Discussion
In face recognition with SVM classifiers, one classifier is created for each enrollee. The classifier outputs a predicted class label and a classification score for each query templatê f q , wheref q is a protected template generated from the template of a query, f q . The classification score is the distance from the query to the boundary ranging. The relation between the classification score S q and a threshold τ for the positive label of f q is given as if S q ≥ τ then accept; else reject.
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3) Unauthorized outflow (p
From these results, the use of key condition 2 enhances the robustness of the security against spoofing attacks.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a privacy-preserving SVM computing scheme with protected templates. It was shown that templates protected by a unitary transform has some useful properties, and the properties allow us to securely compute SVM algorithms without any degradation of the performances. Besides, two key conditions were considered to enhance the robustness of the security against various attacks. Some facebased authentication experiments using SVM classifiers were also demonstrated to experimentally confirm the effectiveness of the proposed framework. 
